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ABSTRACT 
This study assessed the effects of firms’ characteristics on earnings management of listed 
companies in Nigeria. To achieve the objectives of this study, a total of 20 listed firms in the 
Nigerian stock exchange market were selected and analyzed for the study using the judgmental 
sampling technique. The corporate annual reports for the period 2006-2010 were used for the 
study. In testing the research hypothesis, the study adopted the use of both descriptive statistics and 
econometric analysis using the pooled ordinary least square regression for the listed sampled 
firms. Findings from the study revealed that while firm size and firms’ corporate strategy have a 
significant positive impact on earnings management (proxied by discretionary accruals); on the 
other hand, the relationship between firms’ financial leverage and discretionary accruals of the 
sampled firms in Nigeria was not significant. Thus, the study concludes that large firms tend to 
have higher motivations and more prospects to engage in the manipulation earnings and 
exaggerate earnings due to the intricacy of their operations and the complexity for users to identify 
overstatement. 
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Contribution/ Originality 
This study contributes to existing literature by providing a more robust model (framework) that 
analysis the effects of firm size, firm leverage and corporate strategy on firms’ earnings 
management in Nigeria.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Over the years, the concept of earnings management has raised serious concerns among 
financial market regulators, financial operators, investors and academic researchers; as reflected in 
one of the speeches of the former U.S Security and Exchange Commission Chairman in 2002. 
More so, this concept has continued to receive attention due to the series of corporate failures in 
both developed and developing economies. This trend has invariably increased the doubts in the 
minds of stakeholders on the credibility and reliability of financial report. The importance attached 
to accounting earnings by stakeholders of any given organisation cannot be over emphasized; as the 
entire fate of the organisation and its stakeholders depend on it. More so, accounting as a field also 
has a stake to protect, owing to the fact that earnings are the last product of the whole accounting 
process. 
The term `earnings management' embodies a wide array of accounting techniques used by 
management to achieve a specific earnings objective. While there exists no single accepted 
definition of earnings management, accounting literature provides various descriptions of the 
practice. Schipper (1989) described it as a deliberate intervention in the external financial reporting 
process, with the intent of obtaining some private gains. According to Healy and Wahlen (1999) it 
involves manipulating the earnings figures being disclosed, through the use of the judgemental 
discretions as permitted by the generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), in other to either 
mislead the users into believing what is actually not true in respect of the earnings’ figures, and 
hence secure favourable response or to exaggerate contractual outcomes which depend on the 
disclosed earnings. However, while Akers et al. (2007) and Uwuigbe et al. (2014) described it as 
efforts of management to manipulate reported earnings by using certain accounting methods or 
changing methods, recognizing non-recurring items, deferring or speeding up expenses or revenue, 
or using other techniques designed to influence short-term earnings; Cornett et al. (2008) on the 
other hand described it as an anticipatory step to avoid an in-default situation in a loan agreement, 
reduce the regulatory cost, and increase the regulatory benefit. Thus, it is an intentional structuring 
of reporting or production/investment decisions around the bottom line impact. That is, it 
encompasses income smoothing behaviour and also includes any attempt to alter reported income 
that would not occur unless management were concerned with the financial reporting implications.  
Current global trend indicates that the anxiety for the examination into the practice of earnings 
manoeuvre becomes even more salient following the current global trend of corporate failures that 
have bedevilled large organisation such as Health South, Global Crossing, Parmalat, Hollinger, 
Adecco, TV Azteca, Enron, Worldcom and Tyco (Uwuigbe, 2013). This phenomenon has led to 
heated debate among regulators, accounting practitioners, financial analyst and researchers to find a 
solution to the unprecedented corporate failures. This is particularly the case in most developing 
economies were in spite of the various governance structures and frameworks established by most 
countries, cases of corporate malpractices still remain prevalent. This is also the case in Nigeria 
where despite the publication of a new corporate governance code in 2003 and 2011; cases of 
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misappropriation of fund and falsification of reports to suit management interest has continued 
unabatedly. Hence, this study adds to the body of existing knowledge by assessing the relationship 
between firms’ characteristics and earnings management of listed companies in Nigeria. 
To gain more insight into this paper, the remainder of this paper has been organized as follows. 
Section 2 presents an in-depth review of related relevant literatures and hypotheses development. 
While section 3 focused on the research methodology adopted for the study; section 4 and 5 
discusses the findings and conclusion of study. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
Earning management remains an important issue that has come to the front burner in recent 
debate on corporate failures regarding unethical behaviour Uwuigbe et al. (2014). It involves the 
intentional manipulation of financial information to either delude investors on the underlying 
economic status of an organisation or to gain some contractual benefits that depend largely on 
accounting numbers (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986; Healy and Wahlen, 1999; Uwuigbe et al., 
2012; Uwuigbe et al., 2014) Hence, managers can use their control over the firm to achieve 
personal objectives at the expense of stakeholders (Uwuigbe et al., 2012; Uwuigbe, 2013). In this 
regard, Kang and Kim (2011) opined that management could influence reported earnings by 
making accounting choices or by making operating decisions discretionally. Prior studies on 
managers’ decision to manage earning using accruals or by real activities remain one of the most 
common researches in the economics and financial literatures, and it continues to be relevant till 
date. Over the last two decades, prior literatures have examined the determinants and consequences 
of earnings management (Dechow et al., 2010; Uwuigbe, 2013; Uwuigbe et al., 2014). However, a 
fundamental issue that has received very limited attention over the years is the effect of firms’ 
characteristics or attributes on earnings management. Ball and Foster (1982) in their study observed 
that large firms are less likely to engage in earnings management due to the fixed costs associated 
with maintaining adequate internal control procedures over financial reporting. Albrecth and 
Richardson (1990) in a related study observed that large firms have less incentive to smooth 
earnings than small firms. Similarly, Sánchez-Ballesta and García-Meca (2007) suggested that 
large concentrated firms are less likely to engage in earnings management than small firms. Lee 
and Choi (2002) also observed that firm size is that attribute that influences a firm’s tendency to 
manage earnings. Accordingly, they opined that smaller firms are more likely to manage earnings 
to avoid reporting losses than larger firms. On the other hand, Rangan (1998) opined that larger 
firms were more susceptible to manipulating their current accruals to overstate the earnings of the 
experienced equity offerings. Similarly, findings from Degeorge et al. (1999) reiterated the fact that 
large companies manoeuvred their earnings to avoid the negative earnings report.  
In a related study, Press and Weintrop (1990) observed evidence that high leverage is 
positively associated with the likely hood of violating debt covenants. Also, Sweeney (1994) 
observed that firms near default employed income-increasing accounting changes in order to delay 
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their technical default. Mohrman (1996) supports this view by arguing that firms with higher 
leverage are expected to adopt accounting procedures that increase current income. More so, prior 
studies by Mcconnell and Servaes (1995), Lang et al. (1996) and Aivazian et al. (2005) shows that 
financial leverage has a negative relation over firm’s investment, which means that the ones with 
higher leverage often have lower investments. Similarly, Ujah and Brusa (2011) observed that both 
financial leverage and cash flow volatility impact the degrees to which firms manage their earnings. 
However, Jensen (1986) and Ke (2001) argued that debt creation tend to reduces manager’s 
optimistic behaviour.  
Although, some considerable amount of literature exists on the interaction between firms 
characteristics and earnings management in developed economies, most notably the United States, 
Russia and France; however, the same is not true in developing economies like Nigeria where there 
is a relatively dearth in literature in this area, coupled with the huge institutional differences 
between Nigeria and other developed economies. Hence, this study will attempt to find out the 
relationship between firms’ characteristics and earnings management of listed companies in 
Nigeria. 
 
2.1. Development of Hypotheses 
Drawing  from  the  literature,  the  hypotheses  to  be  tested  in  this  study  are  stated below 
in their null forms: 
1) H1: There is a significant relationship between firm’s corporate strategy and earnings 
management of listed firms in Nigeria 
2) H2: There is no significant relationship between firm size and earnings management of listed 
firms in Nigeria. 
3) H3: There is no significant relationship between firm’s leverage and earnings management of 
listed firms in Nigeria. 
 
3. METHODOLOGY 
To achieve the objectives of this study, the annual report for the period 2006-2010 were 
analyzed. The choice of these periods arises based on the fact that it was plagued with a number of 
corporate frauds arising from firms in Nigeria and other developed economies due to poor 
corporate governance practice and institutional failures. However, using the judgmental sampling 
technique; a total of 20 listed firms were analysed. The choice of the selected firms’ arises based on 
the nature of corporate failures and scandals that has bedevilled the industry overtime. 
Nevertheless, in testing the research hypothesis, the study adopted the use of both descriptive 
statistics and econometric analysis using pooled ordinary least square regression for the listed 
sampled firms in the estimation of the regression equation under consideration. 
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3.1. Specifications of the Econometric Model  
3.1.1. Dependent Variable  
The dependent variable in this study is earnings management and it was measured by 
discretional accruals (DAC). However, based on prior literatures, the accrual approach to earnings 
management was adopted. This is because, the estimation of the scope of earnings management is 
better served with accrual models though the use of discretional line items is best used for accuracy 
in detection. Also, this approach makes it easier to manage earnings via credit sales than cash 
collections. In addition, it attempts to control for the endogeneity bias in the original. More so, 
according to Uwuigbe et al. (2014) and Uwuigbe et al. (2012), this approach is one of the most 
famous and most frequently used models used to detecting earnings management. Hence, the 
modified Jones model of estimating discretional accruals was used. 
 
3.1.2. Modified Jones Model 
TA/A (t-1) = β1 (1/At-1) + β2 (∆ in Rev- ∆ in Rec) /At-1) + β3 (PPE/At-1) + ϵit 
TA  = Operating income - Cash from operating activities 
Where: 
TA  = Total Accruals 
Ait-1  = Total Assets at the beginning of the year 
∆ Revit  = Change in sales from year t-1 to t 
∆ Recit  = Change in receivables from year t-1 to t 
PPEit    = Plant, property and Equipment 
β1, β2, β3 = Represents firms specific parameters.  
ϵ  = Residual here represents the firm specific discretionary portion off accruals. 
However, while the right side of the equation represents the non-discretionary accruals, the net 
result for the left side represents the total accruals. Hence taking the difference between the two 
sides, it amounts to the discretionary accruals.  
 
3.1.3. Independent Variables 
The independent variables for this research are firm size, firm leverage and firm corporate 
strategy. However, cash holding was adapted as the control variable for this study. This is because 
it is also considered as a potential determinant of earnings management. The control variable is 
used because it provides a better predictability and analysis of the relationship existing between the 
constructs. Hence, introducing the constructs of the dependent and independent variables, the 
regression equation adapted for this study is modelled in the following functional form as: 
DACit   = F (FSZEit, LEVit, CSTRATit, µit)................................................................... (1) 
The robust model can be written as  
DACit  = β0 + β1FSZE it + β2LEVit + β3 CSTRATit + µit...................................................................... (2) 
DACit   = β0 + β1FSZEit + β2LEVit + β3CSTRATit + β4CASHit + µit........................................... (3) 
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Where: 
DAC = Discretionary and non-discretionary accruals. 
FSZE  = This is measured as the log of total assets. 
LEV = This measures the cost of debt. The value is calculated as total debt to total  
assets. This measures the value of total asset acquisition, financed by debts. 
CSTRAT = Corporate Strategy: According to Shian and Tam (2010), is measured based on 
growth strategy and liquidity strategy. Growth strategy is in two dimensions 
sales and growth potential. Growth potential is estimated by the firm’s market 
value of assets divided by the book value of assets while liquidity strategy is 
measured by liquidity ratio which signifies the proportion of the firm’s total 
assets that are highly liquid. This in turn reflects how well the firm manages its 
liquidity position on a period-to-period basis. Hence, this study measured 
corporate strategy based on growth strategy. It is measured as the growth of 
total asset which is total assett – total assett-1/total assett  
CASH = measured as cash and cash equivalent divided by total asset (control  
variable). 
β = coefficient of parameter 
it  = Time coefficient 
µ  = error term 
A priori specification: The expectations are such that β3 < 0, β1 > 0 β2 > 0. 
 
4. DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS 
The table below (table 1) presents the descriptive statistics of all the variables used in the 
study.  
 
Table-1. Descriptive Statistics of Variable 
Variable  Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min  Max 
DAC 100 -0.1018007 0.5967804 -1.8185 1.3477 
FSZE 100 10.874 0.7289805 8.686138 12.29165 
LEV 100 0.6011414 0.292628 0.0007 1.3303 
CSTRAT 100 0.2211942 0.28488081 -0.8478 0.9219 
CASH 100 0.0812014 0.1052269 -0.0941893 0.5602789 
 
Table (1) basically provides a summary of the descriptive statistics from both the dependent 
and independent variables for the sampled firms. Result from the descriptive statistics provides a 
mean discretionary accrual value (DAC) of about -0.1018007 with a standard deviation of 
0.5967804. This result implies that on the average the sampled firms engaged in downward 
earnings management activities to create a cookie jar reserves, reducing earnings to lower stock 
prices prior to granting stock options prior to repurchasing stock on the open market and to reduce 
political costs. Also, the table provides an approximate mean values for the independent variables 
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(FSZE, LEV and CSTAT) as 10%, 60%, 22% and 8% respectively. This result indicates that on the 
average financial leverage represents about 60% of the total assets of the sampled firms (that is 
they are highly geared). On the other hand, the mean value for corporate strategy (proxied by 
CSTRAT) shows that the growth rate for the sampled firms stood at about 22% annually.  
 
Table-2. Correlations Matrix for Sampled firms 
  DAC FSZE LEV CORPSTRAT CASH 
DAC 1         
FSZE 0.3742 1       
LEV 0.2638 0.5746 1     
CORPSTRAT 0.2097 -0.0266 0.1046 1   
CASH 0.1056 0.2995 0.2087 0.1802 1 
 
Table-3. Anova 
Source SS DF MS 
Model 6.75970481 4 1.6899262 
Residual 28.4988373 95 .29987761 
Total 35.2585421 99 .35614689 
 
Table-4. Regression Analysis 
DAC Coefficient Std. Err. t P > t  [95% Conf. Interval ] 
FSZE .308074 .095745 3.22 0.002 .1179961 .4981519 
LEV .308074 .2324006 0.31 0.756 -0.3889862 .5337609 
CSTRAT .4733783 .1991854 2.38 0.019 .0779453 .8688113 
CASH -0.3130397 .5593719 -0.56 0.577 -1.423533 .7974539 
_Cons -3.5746 .9673147 -3.7 0.000 -5.494963 -1.654238 
No. of Obs 100      
F (4, 95) 5.63      
Prob. F 0.0004      
R-squared 0.1917      
Adj. R-squared 0.1577      
Root MSE .54771      
 
Analysis of the outcome from the correlation analysis as depicted in table (2) shows that a 
positive correlation exist between firm size and discretionary accruals. This is outrightly indicated 
in the correlation coefficient (r) result as (0.3742). This result basically implies that as the size of a 
firm increases, the level of earnings management in that company increases. More so, results from 
the table further depict the fact that a positive correlation does exists between firms’ financial 
leverage and discretionary accruals. This result is shown in the correlation coefficient (r) result of 
(0.2638).  Similarly, the study also observed that a positive relationship exist between firms' 
corporate strategy and discretionary accruals. This is also depicted in the correlation coefficient (r) 
result of (0.2097). This result indicates that as a company grows, the level of earnings management 
tends to increases. For the control variable, the study observed that relationship between firm cash 
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and cash equivalent and discretionary accruals shows a positive relationship of 0.1056 which 
indicates that the higher the cash holding, the higher the level of earnings management.  
Tables (3) and (4) present the result of the regressions (Anova and model summary) which 
tested all the stated hypotheses (i.e. H1- H3). The results as summarized in the tables suggest that 
the 16% variation in the dependent variable can be explained by the independent variables 
suggesting clearly that simultaneously the explanatory variables are significantly associated with 
the dependent variable. The use of multivariate hypothesis test is based on the assumption of no 
significant multicollinearity between the explanatory variables. Non-existence of multicollinearity 
between the independent variables was confirmed when computing the variance inflation factors 
(VIFs) for each of the explanatory variables used in the study.  
Interestingly, empirical evidence from the study suggest that consistent with our initially stated 
a priori expectation (i.e. β1 > 0, β2 > 0, β3 < 0,). A significant positive relationship was found 
between firm size and discretionary accruals. This outcome is evident in the P>|t| (Prob) value of 
(0.002) for firm size. This result basically implies that growing firms are inclined to earnings 
management. That is the larger the firm, the higher its likely hood to engage in earnings 
management activities. In addition, large firms tend to have higher motivations and more prospects 
to engage in the manipulation earnings and exaggerate earnings due to the intricacy of their 
operations and the complexity for users to identify overstatement. In essence, larger firms are more 
susceptible to manoeuvring their current accruals to exaggerate the earnings equity offerings. This 
outcome is consistent with the findings of Fernandes and Ferreira (2007), Naz et al. (2011) and 
Olatunji and Fakile (2012). However, this result contradicts the findings of Persons (1995) and Ball 
and Foster (1982) were a negative relationship was observed between firm size and discretionary 
accruals.  
Also consistent with our a priori expectation, findings for the second hypothesis suggest a 
positive relationship between firms’ financial leverage and discretionary accruals. However, this 
relationship is not significant as depicted in the P>|t| (Prob) value of (0.756) for firms’ financial 
leverage. Hence the null hypothesis which states that there is no significant positive relationship 
between firms’ financial leverage and discretionary accruals of the sampled firms in Nigeria is 
accepted. 
Finally, consistent with our a priori expectation, findings for the third hypothesis suggest a 
significant positive relationship between firms’ corporate strategy and discretionary accruals of the 
sampled firms. This is evident in the P>|t| (Prob) value of (0.019) for firms’ corporate strategy 
(measured as). Hence the alternate hypothesis is accepted. This outcome is however in line with the 
findings of Matsumoto (2002) were they opined that firms with high growth prospects have greater 
incentives to manipulate earnings to avoid unfavourable market reaction to negative earnings news. 
Hence, growing firms are more firms are more inclined to earnings management. Thus, the higher 
the growth prospect, the higher the engagement in earnings management. 
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5. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This study basically examined the effects of firms’ characteristics on earning management of 
of listed firms in Nigeria. The study came up with the following findings that are of salient 
importance to scholars investigating issues relating to firms’ characteristics and earnings 
management in the Nigerian context. Findings from our determination test indicate that about 16% 
change in firm’s earnings management decisions can be explained by firms attributes 
(characteristics). Evidence from the study further reveals that a significant positive relationship 
exists between firm size and discretionary accruals (earnings management). This results appear to 
corroborate the suggestion that firm size is a variable that tends to influence a firm's tendency to 
manage earnings and might affect the magnitude  of earnings surprise or earnings informativeness. 
More so, it supports the argument that large firms tend to have higher motivations and more 
prospects to engage in the manipulation earnings and exaggerate earnings due to the intricacy of 
their operations and the complexity for users to identify overstatement. Similarly while, evidence 
from the study also suggested the fact that a significant positive relationship exist between firms’ 
corporate strategy and discretionary accruals of the sampled firms; on the other hand, the 
relationship between firms’ financial leverage and discretionary accruals of the sampled firms in 
Nigeria was not significant. This 
implies that highly levered companies do not engage in earnings management in a bid to have 
reports that will enable them to attract capital at reasonable rates. Hence the study concludes that 
auditors should pay close attention to the size of the firm in the audit process, since the larger the 
firm the higher the management of earnings. 
This study is however limited by the fact that the sample only covers five (5) years data from 
the Nigerian stock exchange market. Besides, only three assessable variables for firm’s 
characteristics were considered in this study. However, future research could consider other firms 
attributes or characteristics not considered in this study. In addition, based on the demerits of the 
modified Jones model adopted in this study, future research could examine other models relating to 
earnings management. 
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